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I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Nature Of The Case 
This case arises from the personal animosity, dislike and the deterioration of the business 
relationship of Respondent, Donnelly Prehn (hereinafter "Prehn") against Appellant, Michael L. 
Hodge, II (hereinafter "Hodge") who were the two majority stakeholders in the dissolved Idaho 
limited liability company then known as The Source Store, LLC (hereinafter "Source l "). 
The primary issue on appeal which would render all the other issues on appeal moot and 
remanded was the district court's failure to comply with and follow the rules and procedures 
mandated by the Idaho statutes and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for the Respondents to 
proceed forward with their derivative action on behalf of Source 1 against Hodge. 
The failure of the district court to follow the rules and law for a derivative action to 
proceed forward and the Respondents own admission that entire litigation was not a "true 
derivative action," but a direct and personal action against Hodge for Prehn's personal repayment 
of his loan and back salary clearly requires that the district court's decision and award of 
damages be reversed and remanded with instructions that the case proceed as a direct action 
under Idaho Code § 30-6-901. 
B. Relevant Procedural History 
On April 27, 2012, Respondents, Donnelly Prehn and Dwight Bandak, filed its First 
Amended Complaint against Source 1 and derivative action on behalf of Source 1 against Hodge, 
Source 2, George M. Brown and Christopher Claiborne. See R., pp. 2-15. 1 
On May 3, 2012, Respondents filed their Application for Temporary Restraining Order 
and Motion for Preliminary Injunction and accompanying pleadings. See id. 
1 The entire procedural history of the case is outlined in the ROA Report which is part of the Clerk's Record. For 
purposes of simplicity, Hodge recites and references the ROA Report in the Clerk's Record. 
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On May 8, 2012, the parties appeared at the scheduled hearing date on the Application 
for Temporary Restraining Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction and therein reached an 
agreement and orally stipulated the terms of the agreement before the Court. On May 17, 2012, 
the Court entered its Order RE: Dissolution of The Source Store, LLC and Related Matters 
memorializing the stipulated terms presented to the Court. See id. 
On June 29, 2012, Respondents filed their Second Amended Complaint against Hodge 
and The Source, LLC and derivative action on behalf of Source 1 against Hodge, The Source, 
LLC ("Source 2"), George M. Brown and Christopher Claiborne. See id. 
On July 18, 2012, Hodge and Source 2 filed their Answer to Respondent's Second 
Amended Complaint. See id. 
On July 19, 2012, Source 1 filed its Answer to Respondent's Second Amended 
Complaint. See id. 
On August 2, 2012, George Brown filed his Answer to Respondents' Second Amended 
Complaint. See id. 
On August 14, 2012, Christopher Claiborne filed his Answer to Second Amended 
Complaint, Counterclaim and Cross-claim. See id. 
On August 29, 2012, Hodge and Source 2's filed their Answer to Claiborne's 
Counterclaims and Cross-claims. See id. 
On August 29, 2012, Source 1 's filed its Answer to Claiborne's Counterclaims and 
Cross-claims. See id. 
On September 4, 2012, Respondents' filed their Reply to Claiborne Counterclaim. See 
id. 
On September 26, 2012, the Court entered its Order Governing Proceedings and Setting 
Trial. The court trial was scheduled for April 1, 2013 at 9 a.m. for four ( 4) days. See id. 
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On January 17, 2013, Source 1 filed its Report of Wind Up. See id. 
On March 1, 2013, Source 1 and Appellant filed their Joint Motion to Dismiss Derivative 
Claims with accompanying pleadings. See id. 
On March 8, 2013, Respondents and George Bro\vn filed their Stipulation for Voluntary 
Dismissal With Prejudice of George Bro\vTI. See id. On June 6, 2013, the Court entered its 
Order granting the Stipulation for Voluntary Dismissal With Prejudice of George Bro\vTI. See id. 
On March 11, 2013, all parties filed a Stipulation for Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice 
of nine (9) claims asserted by Respondents in their Second Amended Complaint. See id. On 
June 6, 2013, the Court entered its Order granting the Stipulation for Voluntary Dismissal With 
Prejudice of those claims. See id. 
On March 13, 2013, Respondents filed their Objection and Response to Joint Motion to 
Dismiss Derivative Claims with accompanying pleadings. See id. 
On March 20, 2013, Hodge and Source 2 filed its Motion to Exclude Respondent's 
Expert Witnesses and Expert Opinions on Damages, Valuation or Any Other Matter for failure to 
disclose in accordance with the Court's Order Governing Proceedings and Setting Trial with 
accompanying pleadings. See id. 
On March 28, 2013, Respondents and Claiborne filed their Stipulation for Voluntary 
Dismissal With Prejudice as to the claims between them. See id. On June 6, 2013, the Court 
entered its Order granting the Stipulation for Voluntary Dismissal With Prejudice of Christopher 
Claiborne. See id. 
On March 29, 2013, Hodge, Source 1, Source 2 and Claiborne filed their stipulation for 
Voluntary Dismissal With Prejudice as to the claims between them. See id. 
On April l, 2013, the Court declined to hear Hodge and Source 1 's Joint Motion To 
Dismiss Derivative Claims and granted Hodge's Motion to Exclude Expert Witnesses and 
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Opinions and vacated the trial to allow Hodge, Source 1 and Source 2 the opportunity to review 
and rebut the untimely disclosures. See id. 
On June 19, 2013, the Court entered its Second Order Governing Proceedings and Setting 
Trial. The court trial was scheduled for December 2, 2013 at 9 a.m. for four (4) days. See id. 
On December 2, 2013 through December 6, 2013, the court trial was held. See id. 
On December 23, 2013, Hodge, Source 1 and Source 2 filed their Closing Argument See 
id. That same day, Respondents filed their Closing Argument. See id. 
On January 3, 2014, Appellant, Source 1 and Source 2 filed their Rebuttal Closing 
Argument See id. That same day, Respondents filed their Rebuttal Closing Argument. See id. 
On February 19, 2014, the Court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
See id. 
On March 5, 2014, Respondents filed their Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs 
with accompanying pleadings. See id. 
On March 18, 2014, Hodge, Source l and Source 2 filed their Motion for 
Reconsideration of Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. See id. 
On March 19, 2014, Hodge, Source 1 and Source 2 filed their Objection to Respondents' 
Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs and Motion to Disallow Attorney Fees and Costs with 
accompanying pleadings. See id. 
On April 1, 2014, Judgments were entered for Donnelly Prehn and Source l. See id. 
On April 15, 2014, Respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration. See id. 
On April 22, 2014, Hodge, Source 1 and Source 2 filed their Memorandum in Opposition 
to Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration. See id. 
On April 22, 2104, Respondents filed their Response to Hodge, Source 1 and Source 2's 
Motion for Reconsideration. See id. 
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On April 22, 2014, Respondent's filed their Opposition to Hodge, Source l and Source 
2's Objection to Respondent's Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs and Motion to Disallow 
Attorney Fees and Costs. See id. 
On April 25, 2014, Hodge, Source 1 and Source 2 filed their Reply Memorandum to 
Respondents' Response to their Motion for Reconsideration. See id. 
On April 25, 2014, Hodge, Source 1 and Source 2 filed their Response to Respondents' 
Opposition to their Objection to Respondents' Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs. See id 
On April 25, 2014, Respondents filed their Reply in Support of their Motion for 
Reconsideration. See id. 
On July 22, 2014, The Court entered its Memorandum Decisions and Orders concerning 
Costs and Attorney Fees and Motions for Reconsideration._See id. 
On July 22, 2014, The Court entered its Amended Judgment in favor of Source 1 and 
Prehn. See id. 
On August 18, 2014, the Court entered a Second Amended Judgment in favor of Source 1 
and Prehn. See id. 
On August 28, 2014, Hodge filed his Notice of Appeal. See id. 
On September 10, 2014, Hodge filed its Motion for Entry of Final Judgment with 
accompanying pleadings. See id. 
On September 12, 2014, Respondents filed their objection to Hodge's Motion for Entry 
of Final Judgment. See id. 
On October 3, 2014, the Court entered its Third Amended Judgment in favor of Source 1 
and Prehn. See id. 
On October 10, 2014, Hodge filed his Amended Notice of Appeal. See id. 
On October 17, 2014, Respondents filed their Notice of Substitution of Counsel. See id. 
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On October 24, 2014, Respondents filed their Request for Additional Record. See id. 
C. Statement of Facts 
Source 1 was a sole proprietorship established by Hodge.2 In 2002, Prehn and Hodge 
joined together and converted Source 1 to an Idaho limited liability company3. Initially, Hodge's 
ownership interest was 85% and Prehn's 15%.4 Later, Respondent Dwight Bandak ("Bandak"), 
Defendants George M. Brown ("Brown") and Christopher Claiborne ("Claiborne") became 
owners of Source L 5 At the time of dissolution, Hodge's interest was approximately 39 .63 7%, 
Prehn's interest was 37.975%, Bandak's interest was 10.66%, Clainorne's interest was 6.79% 
and Brown's interest was 4.94%.6 
Source 1 developed, designed, produced and sold merchandise and apparel for 
promotional and marketing purposes. 7 
In 2009, the relationship between Prehn and Hodge began to deteriorate. 8 In December, 
2010, Source 1 members held its annual meeting where all the members unanimously agreed, 
including Prehn, that Prehn would stop working as a fulltime employee for the company and 
Hodge, as sole managing member, would operate and control the direction of the company 
exclusively. 9 
For a number of years, Source 1 was not profitable. 10 In 2010, Source l generated a 
profit which all the members received their distributions in proportion to their interest in 2012. 11 
2 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on February 19, 2014, R., p. 759. 
3 See id., R., p. 758. 
4 See id., R., p. 759. 
5 See id. 
6 Amended Affidavit of Ed Guerricabeitia In Support of Motion to Dismiss Derivative Claims, Ex. G, R., p. 571. 
7 Findings ofFact and Conclusions of Law entered on February 19, 2014, R., p. 759. 
8 See id., R., p. 760. 
9 See TR., p. 33, LI. 20-25, p. 34, Ll.l-25, p. 35, LI. 1-25, p. 36, LI. 1-7, p. 670, LI. 12-25, p. 671, LI. 1-25, p. 672, 
LI. 1-25, p. 673, LI. 1-25, and p. 674, LI. 1-6. 
1° Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on February 19, 2014, R., p. 760. 
11 See id., See also, TR., p. 271, LI. 23-25. 
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Per Article 6.5 of the Operating Agreement, a majority vote of the membership shares 
would determine from time to time the amount of compensation the managing member would 
receive. 12 In 2011, Hodge proposed a salary increase from $60,000 to $144,000 per year to the 
membership based on his new expansive role in the company. 13 The majority of members voted 
in favor of the proposaL 14 Prehn, initially objected to the proposal, but later acquiesced to 
Hodge's proposed salary increase. 15 In 2012, Hodge's salary continued even during the 
dissolution and at the end of year his total compensation paid out by Source 1 was $123,510.07 
acting as both manager and liquidator for Source 1 which amounted to approximately $20,500 
less than the amount previously voted on the year prior. 16 
In 2011, Source 1 generated its largest yearly since the inception of the company. The 
yearly distributions for 2011 were made to all members in April and May, 2012. 17 
Despite Source 1 's 2011 annual profit, Prehn continued to oppose Hodge's management 
and direction of Source 1. In January, 2012, after continuous in fighting and arguments between 
Prehn and Hodge concerning the management and direction of the company, Prehn wanted to 
have Hodge fired as manager. 18 
Thereafter, Prehn proposed to the membership a buyout of his membership interest in 
Source 1 or, in the alternative, a buyout of Hodge's membership interest. 19 
12 Second Amended Complaint, Ex. A., R., p. 175. 
13 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on February 19, 2014, R., p. 76 l. 
14 See id. 
15 TR., p. 247, LI. 7-25 and p. 248, LI. l-2. See also, Defendant's Exhibit 1019. 
16 See Defendant's Exhibit 1009, specifically the December 2012, Profit & Loss Statement for Source l showing the 
year to date balance of Hodge's salary was$ 123,510.07 for the entire 2012 calendar year for Source l. 
17 TR.,p.272,Ll.18-25,andp.273,Ll.1-17. 
18 TR., p. 257, LI. 7-11. 
19 TR., p. 257, LI. 12-25 and p. 258, LI. 1-3. See also, Defendant's Exhibit 1030. 
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Source 1 hired a business brokerage firm to appraise the value of Source 1 as an on-going 
concem.20 In a valuation dated February 3, 2012, the appraisal determined the on-going concern 
value of Source 1 was $1,367,068.21 
On March 15, 2012, Hodge made a proposal to purchase Prehn's interest based on the 
February appraisal and extended an offer of $337,000.22 Prehn rejected the proposed offer and 
presented a counteroffer of over $630,000 which was rejected as well.23 
On April 4, 20 I 2, Hodge emailed the membership for a vote to dissolve Source I 
effective April 1, 2012. 24 Within fifteen (15) minutes, Prehn voted to dissolve Source l per 
Hodge's email.25 The other members also unanimously voted to dissolve Source 1.26 
On April 9, 2012, Source 1 received a purchase order from Bodybuilding.com.27 The 
purchase order was an oversea order which would have taken three to four ( 4) months to process 
at best. 28 Source 1 had not yet accepted the order nor had Bodybuilding.com tendered its deposit 
per the parties' rebate agreement. Hodge wanted the advice from Source 1 's counsel to 
determine whether to accept the purchase order in light of the vote of dissolution. 
On April 13, 2012, the members participated in a telephone conference with Source l's 
counsel who discussed the process of dissolution in some detail. 29 Source l's counsel explained 
that after the vote of dissolution, the company should not accept additional purchase orders, but 
2° Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on February 19, 2014, R., p. 761. 
21 See id 
22 See id. 
23 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on February 19, 2014, R., p. 761. See also, Defendant's Exhibit 
1042 
24 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on February 19, 2014, R., p. 761. 
25 See Defendant's Exhibit 1044. 
26 See id. 
27 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on February 19, 2014, R., p. 768. 
28 TR., p. 416, LI. 18-22 and p. 419, LI. 16-19. 
29 Findings ofFact and Conclusions of Law entered on February 19, 2014, R., p. 763. See also, Dissolution Call 
with Mike Baldner admitted as Plaintifrs Exhibit 132 and Defendant's Exhibit 1002. 
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needed to continue to process those purchase orders in place at the time of dissolution.30 Hodge 
informed the membership that Bodybuilding.com recently submitted a purchase order, but had 
yet to pay its deposit nor had Source 1 accepted the order. 31 It was known by all the members 
that Prehn and Hodge intended to compete in the industry and operate their own company.32 
Prehn demanded that Source 1 continue to process the purchase orders during the dissolution.33 
Hodge agreed to continue processing the existing purchase orders and estimated that orders 
could be completed in approximately 2 months and the overhead costs would be between 
$60,000 to $80,000 with a reduced staff in that period of time. 34 
Hodge informed the membership that Source 1 would not accept Bodybuilding.corn's 
purchase order and would process only those purchase orders received in the first quarter to 
completion. 35 Pursuant to Articles 6.1 and 6.2 of the Operating Agreement, it reads: 
6.1 Initial Manager. The Manager shall have the sole and exclusive right 
and power to manage the business of the Company, and shall have all of the rights 
and powers that may be possessed by managers under the Act, including without 
limitation those rights and powers described in this Article 6. The initial Manager 
of the Company shall be Michael L. Hodge, IL 
6.2 Management Authority. The Manager shall have full and complete 
authority, power and discretion to manage and control the business, affairs and 
properties of the Company, to make all decisions regarding those matters and to 
perform any and all other acts or activities customary or incident to the 
management of the Company's business.36 
30 · . See rd, See also, TR., p. 365, LI. 22-25, p. 366, LI. 1-3 and p. 267, LI. 6-9. 
31 See id 
32 See id. See also, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on February 19, 2014, R., p. 763. See also, 
Second Amended Complaint, R. p. 137. 
33 See id 
34 See id 
35 Defendant's Exhibit 1058 and Plaintiff's Exhibit 163. 
36 Second Amended Complaint, Ex. A., R., p. 175. 
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In anticipation of Prehn competing in the industry, Brown filed a Certificate of 
Organization for The Source, LLC ("Source 2") on April 16, 2012, listing Hodge, Desiree 
Claiborne 
On April 2012, Respondents filed this action asserting (13) causes of 
wherein Prehn asserted a direct claim against Source 1 for his loans and back salary and 
derivative claims on behalf of themselves and Source 1 against Hodge and the other 
defendants. 38 In their complaint, Respondents alleged, among other things, that Hodge 
tortuously interfered with Bodybuilding.corn's purchase order by willfully inducing it to rescind 
the existing purchase order with Source 1. 39 
On May 8, 2012, the parties appeared at the hearing on the Application for Temporary 
Restraining Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction and there voluntarily reached an 
agreement in the manner the dissolution and wind up of Source l's affairs would proceed and 
orally recited the terms of the agreement to the Court which were later rnemorialized.40 At the 
time of hearing, Respondents had actual knowledge of Bodybuilding.corn's purchase order and 
Hodge's decision not to process the order.41 Despite this knowledge, the parties agreed that 
Source 1 would complete the approximately $900,000 existing purchase orders that were in place 
at the time of the vote of dissolution which did not include Bodybuilding.corn's purchase order 
received on April 9, 2012.42 Respondents did not request or demand that Source 1 process 
Bodybuilding.corn's purchase order.43 
37 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on February 19, 2014, R., p. 763. 
38 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on February 19, 2014, R., p. 763. See also, First Amended 
Complaint, R. pp. 45-120. 
39 First Amended Complaint, R. pp. 45-120. 
4° Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on February 19, 2014, R., p. 764. 
41 First Amended Complaint, R. pp. 66-67. See also, Plaintiff's Exhibit 163 and Defendant's Exhibit 1058 
42 Order RE: Dissolution of the Source Store, LLC and Related Matters entered on May 17, 2012, R., pp. 121-127. 
43 TR., p. 283, LI. 6-23. 
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On May 17, 2012, the Court entered its Order RE: Dissolution of The Source Store, LLC 
and Related Matters memorializing the agreed upon and stipulated terms of the parties. In the 
provided: 
1. dissolution and winding up of Source 1 (the "Dissolution") shall be 
completed as soon as is reasonably practicable, with the participation and 
cooperation of all parties, in a manner which is fully transparent, accountable, 
fair and equitable to all members of Source 1 and with the view to discharging 
all legitimate debts and other obligations of Source 1 and maximizing the 
return and final distribution of all remaining funds to all Source 1 members. 
2. The parties stipulate and agree that there are approximately $900,000 in open 
purchase orders from Source 1 customers in various stages of processing, 
which are assets of Source I (the "Existing Purchase Orders"). As part of the 
Dissolution, the Existing Purchase Orders shall be processed by Source 1, 
using Source 1 offices, equipment and personnel, in a manner consistent with 
the parameters set forth in paragraph 1 above. 
3. The parties further stipulate and agree that it is in the best interests of Source 1 
and its members that, during and pursuant to the Dissolution, the overhead and 
other expenses of Source 1 be reduced to the absolute minimum necessary to 
complete the Dissolution, including without limitation the processing of the 
existing Purchase Orders and the sale of the Assets, in order to maximize the 
return and final distribution of funds to all Source 1 members. Defendant 
Hodge will generate a proposed budget for completion of the Dissolution and 
circulate it to all the parties as soon as possible. Defendant Hodge will 
identify those persons necessary to complete the processing of the Existing 
Purchase Orders with the understanding and purpose of reducing the overhead 
and expense to the absolute minimum necessary to complete the Dissolution. 
4. Each party shall have full, complete, open and immediate access to all of the 
books and records of Source 1. Plaintiffs shall specifically request, through 
their counsel, the books and records they wish to review. 
5. This Order shall be binding on each of the parties to this litigation, including 
without limitation Source 1 and Source 2.4 
At the hearing, the parties further agreed to hold the auction of Source 1 's assets on May 
18, 2012 and that both Prehn and Hodge would be released from their non-compete agreements 
44 See id 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 14 
with Source 1 effective that same day.45 Before the auction, the parties and their respective 
counsel, agreed that they would cooperate with each other to present instructions to all members 
and participants providing the manner and process the auction would proceed and a description 
of the Assets to be sold.46 
Hodge reduced the employee staff and retain key employees, including himself, to 
complete the existing purchase orders.47 
Hodge prepared proposed auction instructions, with a description of the asset lots and 
submitted the proposed instructions, by email, to all members, participants and their counsel for 
review, comment and changes.48 Respondents objected only to the process of how the bids 
would be submitted and requested a "live auction" to be conducted. 49 Respondents had no 
objections, comments or changes to the description of the asset lots proposed in the 
instructions. 50 Hodge declined to proceed with a "live auction," but offered to submit his final 
bid to counsel, five (5) minutes before the other participants had to submit their final bids, to 
alleviate Respondents concern that Hodge had an unfair advantage in seeing all the bids before 
submitting his final bid. 51 
On May I 8, 2012, the auction of Source I's assets was held. At the conclusion of the 
auction, Prehn and Hodge's final bids for the asset lots were as follows: 
Shaker cup molds: 
Hodge: 
Prehn: 
Embroidery machines: 
$40,200 
$96,000 
Hodge: $10,010 
45 See id. 
46 Order RE: Dissolution of the Source Store, LLC and Related Matters entered on May 17, 2012, R., pp. 121-127. 
47 TR., p. 804, LI. 16-25 and p. 805, LI. 1-10 .. 
48 See Defendant's Exhibit 1062. See also, TR., p. 318, LI. 3-9. 
49 TR., p. 319, LI. 11-17, p. 320, LI. 7-16, p. 344, LI. 12-20 and p. 348, LI. 3-13 .. 
50 See id. 
51 See id. See also, Defendant's Exhibit 1062. 
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Prehn: 
Intellectual Property: 
Hodge: 
Prehn: 
All of Lots 1-4: 
Hodge: 
Prehn: 
$ 
$44,200 
$ 5,100 
$105,010 
$125,20052 
Per the auction instructions, Source 1 would immediately submit its invoices to 
the highest bidders for payment of the assets. 53 The instructions provided that if payment 
was not received on the date certain, the asset lot would be awarded to the second highest 
bidder for payment. 54 Hodge made payment to Source I for the embroidery machine and 
intellectual property. 55 
The day before payment was to be made to Source 1 for the asset lot, Respondents 
emailed Hodge expressing that Prehn could use the shaker cup molds without 
limitation. 56 In response to the email, Hodge informed Respondents that he believed that 
the shaker cup molds contained intellectual property that he was awarded and that 
Respondents could not use his intellectual property. 57 
Respondents disputed and disagreed with Hodge's belief that the molds contained 
52 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on February 19, 2014, R., p. 765-66. 
53 See Defendant's Exhibit 1062. 
54 See id. 
55 See Defendant's Exhibit 1064. See also, Defendant's Exhibit I 007, Source l's May Bank Statement reflecting a 
wire transfer deposit of$54,210 which is the total amount of Hodge's bids on the embroidery machines and 
intellectual property. 
56 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on February I 9, 2014, R., p. 766. See also, Plaintiff's Exhibit 
71. 
57 See Plaintiff's Exhibit 71. 
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-g 59 
any intellectual property.' Respondents elected not to pay Source l for the assets. As 
a result, Hodge was awarded the shaker cup molds and office inventory as the second 
highest bidder and paid to Source 1. 60 
On June 1, 2012, Prehn approached Bodybuilding.com with several proposals to 
enter into an exclusive business venture. One proposal pertained to a shaker cup venture 
where Prehn would assist in the design of the molds and possess a worldwide perpetual 
use license, while Bodybuilding.com funded the cost to construct and deliver the molds 
to the United States. Bodybuilding.com rejected Prehn's proposals.61 
In accordance with the Court's Order, Source 2 began operations and accepted 
purchase orders. In June 2012, Bodybuilding.com submitted a purchase order to Source 
2 which it accepted and processed. 62 
On June 29, 2012, Respondents filed their Second Amended Complaint against 
Hodge and the other defendants. The Second Amended Complaint was verbatim to the 
First Amended Complaint, adding only a factual section entitled "The Auction of The 
Source Assets" and six ( 6) new causes of action all pertaining to and arising from the 
auction.63 
In August, 2012, Hodge eliminated Brown and Bews from Source 1 payroll and 
retained only himself and Mr. Arp, the company's bookkeeper.64 Hodge, also, 
discontinued payment of fixed and variable overhead costs and expenses, such as rent, 
utilities, property insurance and other expense by Source 1 before the completion of the 
58 TR., p. 336, LI. 19-25 and p. 337, LI. 1-3. 
59 TR., p. 359, LI. 3-5. 
6° Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on February 19, 2014, R., p. 766. 
61 See Defendant's Exhibit 1065. 
62 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on February 19, 2014, R., p. 768 and 776. 
63 Second Amended Complaint, R., pp. 128-213. 
64 TR., p. 807, LI. 17-25. See also, Defendant's Exhibit 1009, (August through December Profit & Loss Statements) 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 17 
existing purchase orders.65 In September, 2012, Source 1 completed the purchase orders 
contemplated in the Court's Order.66 
Due to accounting errors in the final accounting that was discovered and needed 
to be corrected, Source l finally filed Report of Wind Up with the Court on January 17, 
2013 stating a cash balance of $20,547.86.67 
On March 1, 2013, Hodge and Source 1 filed its Joint Motion to Dismiss 
Derivative Claims against Respondents. The hearing was scheduled the first day of trial, 
April 1, 2013.68 
On April 1, 2013, the district court refused to hear the Joint Motion for Dismissal 
on the grounds it was filed untimely. On Hodge's Motion to exclude expert witnesses 
and opinions of damages on the grounds that Respondents failed to disclose their alleged 
damages until a week before trial, the district court decided to vacate and reschedule the 
trial to afford Hodge and the other defendants an opportunity to review and refute the 
Respondents' claims of damage. 69 The new trial was scheduled on December I, 2013. 70 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A) Whether the District Court erred in denying as a matter oflaw the Joint Motion to 
Dismiss Derivative Claims and finding as a matter of law that Respondents had properly asserted 
a derivative claim on behalf of Source 1 against Hodge under the Idaho statutes, Idaho Civil 
Rules of Civil Procedure and Idaho law. 
65 See Defendant's Exhibit 1009, (August through December Profit & Loss Statements). 
66 Findings ofFact and Conclusions of Law entered on February 19, 2014, R., p. 769. 
67 See id. 
68 Joint Motion to Dismiss Derivative Claims and accompanied pleadings, R., pp. 536-571. 
69 ROA Report, R., pp. 2-15 
70 See id. 
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B) Whether the District Court erred in finding as a matter of law that the Hodge 
breached his fiduciary duties in the manner he orchestrated the asset auction to Source 1 and its 
members; 
C) Whether the District Court erred in finding as a matter of law that Hodge 
breached his fiduciary duties for failing to minimize the costs of completing the existing 
purchase orders to Source 1 and its members; 
D) Whether the District Court erred as a matter of law in its award of attorney fees 
under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) against Hodge in favor of Source 1; and 
E) Whether the District Court erred as a matter of law in awarding Respondents their 
attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 30-6-906(2) from Source 1 's recovery which included an 
award of attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3). 
IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
The Court's review is limited "to a determination of whether the evidence supports the 
trial court's findings of fact, and whether those findings support the conclusions of law." Sims v. 
Daker, 154 Idaho 975, 303 P.3d 1231, 1233 (2013). This Court applies a de novo standard to 
legal questions and a clear error standard to findings of fact. Herrera v. Estay, 146 Idaho 674, 
679, 201 P.3d 647, 652 (2009). 
When reviewing a trial court's conclusions of law, "this Court is not bound by the legal 
conclusions of the trial court, but may draw its own conclusions from the facts presented." 
Steuerer v. Richards, 155 Idaho 280, 311 P.3d 292,294 (2013). The Court exercises free review 
over the lower court's conclusions of law to determine whether the court correctly stated the 
applicable law, and whether the legal conclusions are sustained by the facts found. Roell v. 
Boise City, 134 Idaho 214, 999 P.2d 251 (2000). 
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However, this Court cannot set aside a trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous. IDAHO RULE OF I.R.C.P. 52( a); Kennedy v. Schneider, 151 Idaho 440, 442, 259 P. 3d 
586, 588 (2011). Findings of fact which are supported by substantial and competent, though 
conflicting, evidence, are not clearly erroneous and may not be disturbed on appeal. Id. 
The failure of a trial court to make findings upon each and every material issue arising 
from the pleadings, upon which proof is offered, will necessitate a remand for additional 
findings, unless such findings would not affect the judgment entered. Perry Plumbing Co. v. 
Schuler, 96 Idaho 494, 497, 531 P.2d 584, 587 (1975). "Under the restrained standard of clear 
error customarily applied to factual issues, a factual finding will not be deemed clearly erroneous 
unless, after reviewing the entire record, an appellate court is left with a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made." State, Dep 't of Health & Welfare v. Roe, 139 Idaho 
18, 21, 72 P.3d 858, 861 (2003). 
B. The District Court erred in denying the Joint Motion to Dismiss Derivative 
Claims and finding as a matter of law that Respondents properly asserted a 
derivative claim on behalf of Source 1 against Hodge in conformance with the 
Idaho statutes, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and Idaho law. 
On March 1, 2013, Hodge and Source 1 filed their Joint Motion to dismiss the derivative 
claims asserted by Respondents. The hearing was scheduled the first day of trial. The district 
court refused to hear the Motion on the grounds that the Motion was brought untimely. 
Of the 19 claims originally asserted in the Respondents' Second Amended Complaint, ten 
of the claims were improperly alleged as derivative claims. The claims asserted as derivative 
actions were Claim 2 (Breach of Operating Agreement); Claim 3 (Breach of Non-compete 
Agreement); Claim 4 (Breach of Fiduciary Duty); Claim 6 (Breach of Loan Agreement between 
Source 1 and Hodge); Claim 7 (Violation of Idaho Trade Secrets Act); Claim 8 (Violation of the 
Lanham Act); Claim 9 (Common Law Trade Name and Trademark Infringement); Claim 10 
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(Unjust Enrichment); Claim 11 (Tortious Interference with Contract); and Claim 12 
(Constructive Trust). 71 For the following reasons, the district court erred in finding that the 
1) Respondents lacked standing to pursue the derivative "''"'""'"' because they were 
not disinterested representatives of the entity and sought only to leverage their own direct claims. 
Standing is a jurisdictional issue which may be raised at any juncture. Martin v. Camas 
County ex rel. Bd ofComm'rs, 150 Idaho 508, 512 (2011). A plaintiffs standing to prosecute a 
derivative claim is predicated on the plaintiffs compliance with I.R.CP. 23(f) in bringing the 
action. Rule 23 (f), "Derivative actions by shareholders", states among other procedural 
requirements that "[A] derivative action may not be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff 
does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders or the members 
similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or association." Rule 23 (f) was 
promulgated for the purpose of preventing abuses by disgruntled members to seek unsupported 
claims against the entity. Orrock v. Appleton, 147 Idaho 613,617 (2009). 
"An adequate representative must have the capacity to vigorously and conscientiously 
prosecute a derivative suit and be free from economic interests that are antagonistic to the 
interests of the class." Larson v. Dumke, 900 F.2d 1363, 1367 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal cites 
omitted). A factored analysis is used to determine whether a plaintiff is an adequate 
representative including the following factors: 
(1) Indications that the plaintiff is not the true party interest; (2) the plaintiffs 
unfamiliarity with the litigation and unwillingness to learn about the suit; (3) the 
degree of control exercised by the attorneys over the litigation; ( 4) the degree of 
support received by the plaintiff from other shareholders; (5) the lack of any 
personal commitment to the action on the part of the representative plaintiff (6) 
71 In the Prayer for Relief, Respondents sought a money judgment "in favor of Source l" and themselves. Claims 7, 
8, and 9 were voluntarily dismissed with prejudice before the trial, along with Claims 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 
which were new claims asserted by Respondents against Source l and Hodge. 
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Id. 
the remedy sought by plaintiff in the derivative action; (7) the relative magnitude 
of plaintiffs personal interests as compared to his interest in the derivative action 
itself; and (8) plaintiffs vindictiveness toward the defendants. 
In that 
Respondents, specifically Prehn, had directly sued the company and then simultaneously were 
attempting to represent the company. Additionally, many of the same facts alleged to support 
their claims directly against the company were repeated as facts supporting their derivative 
actions. For example, the First Claim of Relief alleged a direct claim against Source 1 for 
"Breach of Agreements for Prehn Loan, Back Salary, and Prehn Bonus." These same allegations 
were the basis for much of the Second Claim for Relief that was a derivative claim in which 
Prehn attempted to pursue a company right by suing Hodge because distributions were made 
prior to repayment of the "Prehn Loan." Incidentally, all members, including Respondents, 
agreed, accepted and received their capital contribution for Source 1 's earnings generated in 
2010 and 2011. 72 Despite payment and receipt of over $170,000 by Prehn for his capital 
distribution from past Source 1 's earnings, Prehn complained that Hodge breached the Operating 
Agreement despite doing so with the members' approval.73 Importantly, Respondents did not 
reject the tendered payment nor did they return the capital distribution back to the company. 74 
Yet, Respondents asserted the Second Claim for Relief on behalf of Source 1. 
There were no factual allegations distinguishing the company right sought to be enforced 
through the directive claims from the personal claims of the Respondents. Respondents could 
not have it both ways in which they asserted factual allegations to support their direct claims 
against Source 1 and employed the same allegations to proceed in favor of the company. There 
72 See TR., p. 27 l, LL 23-25, p. 272, LI. 18-25, and p. 273, Ll. l-17. 
73 See id 
74 TR., p. 274, LL 6-12. 
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was nothing disinterested about Respondents attempt to leverage their self-interests under the 
guise of derivative claims. 
On April 4, 2012, all members of Source 1 unanimously voted to dissolve the company 
effective April 1, 2012. 75 The members' percentage ownership in the company was Michael 
Hodge: 39.636%; Donnelly Prehn: 37.974%; Dwight Bandak: 10.66%; Christopher Claiborne: 
6.79%; and George Brown: 4.94%.76 
As mentioned above, the Second Amended Complaint initially asserted Claim 1 against 
Source 1 in favor of Prehn, individually. 
Claims 2 through 4 and 6 through 12 were asserted as derivative claims on behalf of 
Source 1 against Hodge and the other named Defendants. 77 
Claim 5 for Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing was asserted by 
Respondents, individually, against Hodge and the other named defendants, individually, as 
members of the company. 
Claims 14 through 19 were asserted by Respondents, individually, against Source l and 
Hodge which were later voluntarily dismissed with prejudice. 
Respondents, specifically Prehn, were in no way a disinterested member seeking solely to 
protect and enforce the interests of the company. Instead, it was clear that Prehn through the 
disguise of a derivative claim was seeking to recover his damages against Hodge, personally, not 
that of the other members. This could have been not further evident by Respondents filing a 
Motion to Compel against Source 1, despite having complete access to all of the company's 
75 See id. See also, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on February 19, 2014, R., p. 761. 
76 Amended Affidavit of Ed Guerricabeitia In Support of Motion to Dismiss Derivative Claims, Ex. G, R., p. 571. 
77 As noted above, 3 of derivative claims were voluntarily dismissed and the other Defendants were also voluntarily 
dismissed with prejudice from the lawsuit further corroborating that the entire lawsuit was personal between Prehn 
and Hodge which will be addressed below. 
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books and records. 78 The Second Amended Complaint was in fact a direct action under Idaho 
Code § 30-6-901 and should have been treated as such with dismissal of the purported derivative 
action. 
2) Additionally, the district court erred in failing to address whether the Respondents 
properly pled the derivative claims by the following the formalities required under the rules and 
statutes for initiating a derivative action. In its decision, the district court held as a matter oflaw 
without any findings of fact that Respondents sufficiently pled circumstances that constituted 
futility and that the circumstances were also proven at trial. The district court's conclusion after 
refusing to hear the Joint Motion to Dismiss prior to allowing the merits of the claims to be held 
at trial was an error oflaw. 
Idaho Code§ 30-6-902 requires that prior to a member maintaining a derivative action to 
enforce a right of a limited liability company, the member must first make demand that the 
company bring an action to enforce the right or establish that demand would be futile. Rule 23(f) 
requires that if the company fails to enforce the right, a member may file a complaint to enforce 
the right The complaint must be verified and must allege that the plaintiff was a member at the 
time of the transaction complained of and that the action is not collusive to confer jurisdiction on 
the Court that it would not otherwise have. IRCP 23(f). In addition, Rule 23(f) requires the 
following: 
The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the 
plaintiff to obtain the action which plaintiff desires from the directors or 
comparable authority and, if necessary, from the shareholders or members, and 
the reasons for plaintiffs failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort. 
LR.C.P. 23(f) (Emphasis Added). See also, Orrock v. Appleton, 147 Idaho 613, 618 (2009). 
The demand requirement as a precursor to a valid derivative action is significant in that 
78 Order RE: Dissolution of the Source Store, LLC and Related Matters entered on May 17, 2012, R., pp. 121-127. 
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its purpose "affords the directors an opportunity exercise their reasonable business judgment." 
Orrock at 618. 
In analyzing whether a derivative complaint is properly pled, the Idaho Supreme Court 
has stated: 
The test in a shareholder derivative action is whether the plaintiff alleged 
'particularized facts to creating a reasonable doubt that a majority of the Board 
would be disinterested or independent in making a decision on a demand. To 
determine whether demand is futile the court must decide 'whether, under the 
particularized facts alleged, a reasonable doubt is created that: ( 1) the directors 
are disinterested and independent [or] (2) the challenged transaction as otherwise 
the product of valid business judgment. 
Id. On a motion to dismiss, "factual allegations are accepted as true, unless they are 
purely conclusory." Id. 
In this matter, the Respondents' Second Amended Complaint failed to comply with the 
requirements of the statute and rules. It was simply defective on many levels. The Respondents' 
complaint was not verified, nor did it state "with particularity" facts that demand was made on 
Hodge and other named defendants. More importantly, the complaint failed to provide 
particularized facts enough for the district court to make a determination that a reasonable doubt 
existed whether a majority of the company's board members would not have been disinterested 
or independent in making the decision to act on Respondents asserted claims or whether the 
challenged transaction was otherwise the exercise of valid business judgment. 
With regards to demand, Respondents simply repeated the following conclusory 
statement in each of the derivative claims: 
A demand on Hodge requesting Source 1 to bring an action to enforce the 
foregoing rights and claims of Source 1 would be futile because Hodge is neither 
disinterested and independent, nor are the challenged transactions the product of 
Hodge's valid exercise of business judgment. 
The Respondents simply made no demand and asserted conclusory statements that 
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demand was futile. There were no factual allegations supporting Respondents conclusion that 
demand was futile. There were no factual allegations that Respondents made demand to 
members, Brown and Claiborne, that they refused to act upon to enforce Source 1 's rights. For 
example, there were no allegations that Respondents were denied participation in the 
membership meetings leading up to the members' decision to dissolve the entity. There were no 
allegations that prior to initiating this lawsuit, Respondents made efforts to communicate their 
concerns, if any, regarding the company's rights or the treatment of the company's liquidation. 
Absent from the complaint were any allegations that the Respondents were denied participation 
in any part of the liquidation process, including negotiating the terms of the auction. Further, 
there was no allegation that Respondents were denied the opportunity to act as the liquidator or 
that they communicated they demanded a particular receiver or liquidator. The only allegation 
made regarding their participation at all was the allegation that they choose to abstain from 
participating. If any action by Respondents constituted a demand, that action was post the filing 
of the lawsuit, not action taken pre-filing of the lawsuit. 
Instead, the Respondents, along with Hodge and other named defendants, voluntarily 
negotiated and stipulated to the process, the role and participation of all members, and the 
extent of open purchase orders to be processed in the dissolution and wind up of the 
company's affairs which was memorialized by the district court's Order on May 17, 2012. This 
stipulation was negotiated between counsel for all parties at the time for the goal and purpose of 
"maximizing the return and final distribution of all remaining funds to all Source 1 members."79 
All parties had the ability to participate in the process and manner of liquidating the company's 
assets and its final sale. 
3) The district court further erred in failing to consider whether Respondents created 
79 Order RE: Dissolution of the Source Store, LLC and Related Matters entered on May 17, 2012, R., pp. 121-127. 
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an inherent conflict of interest by failing to hire an independent attorney to represent the entity in 
pursuit of the derivative claims. 
To the extent that Respondents had any properly pled derivative claims, Respondents 
created an inherent conflict of interest by proceeding to prosecute the claims for the entity with 
the same attorneys as they had hired to represent their personal claims. Since Respondents 
sought to sue Source 1 while maintaining derivative claims on behalf of the Company, the 
Respondents were adverse to Source 1. They were not only economically adverse to the 
Company---thus disqualifying them as adequate representatives of the Company-they were 
adverse litigants in the same lawsuit. Rule l. 7 of The Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct 
specifically prohibits representation by an attorney of a client that is directly adverse to another. 
In this lawsuit, the Respondents sought to represent the very entity that they sued for reasons 
which will be discussed in further detail below. 
The Honorable Judge Robert l Elgee addressed a very similar issue in Vorse v. D&R 
Real Estate, Case No. CV-2010-763, Idaho's Fifth Judicial District, Blaine County, Order on 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed March 14, 2011.80 Although Judge Elgee's decision is in 
no way binding on this Court, it may provide a useful and persuasive analysis to assist this Court 
in considering and addressing this matter. 
In the Vorse Case, Judge Elgee analyzed whether Ms. Vorse, who was being sued by 
Hourglass Development LLC in a separate lawsuit, could initiate a separate derivative lawsuit on 
behalf of the LLC. Id Ms. Vorse had employed the same attorney to represent her individually 
and to represent her on behalf of the LLC in both lawsuits. Id After reviewing the authorities 
regarding her standing to initiate the derivative action, Judge Elgee determined that Ms. Vorse 
could pursue the derivative action only if independent counsel was obtained. Judge Elgee noted: 
80 See Vorse v. D&R Real Estate, Case No. CV-2010-763, R., pp. 553-67. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 27 
It is important here to determine whether Vorse has an irreconcilable conflict in 
both being sued by and suing the LLC and attempting to manage a derivative suit 
on behalf of the LLC. As long as truly independent counsel is selected to 
represent the plaintiff LLC and the defendant members in this derivative action, 
the court concludes any conflict of interest evaporates. 
*** 
Independent counsel for the LLC in the derivative suit must bear in mind that the 
LLC, and not Vorse, is their client Their fiduciary duties are owed to the LLC 
and not to Vorse. This will be required to bear the litigation costs, including 
attorney fees, of any derivative action against LLC. See Idaho Code § 30-6-906. 
As that section also makes clear, any proceeds of the derivative suit are the 
property of the LLC alone, and no attorney fees are paid to the derivative plaintiff 
unless awarded by the district court. In addition, pursuant to I.R.C.P 23(f) the 
derivative action may not be compromised or dismissed without the approval of 
the court, and notice of such proposed action must be given to all shareholders. 
With these safeguards, the court is satisfied that Vorse is capable of adequately 
representing the minority shareholders on behalf of the LLC. 81 
To the extent that Respondents had validly pled derivative claims, at a minimum, they 
were required to seek and pay for independent counsel to represent the company with regard to 
the derivative claims. 
Incidentally, Source 1 did hire independent counsel to defend the claims by Prehn. 
Notwithstanding, Prehn' s counsel who was also allegedly representing the interests of Source 1 
in the derivative suit was adversarial and uncooperative with Source l's independent counsel as 
illustrated by the Respondents filing of their Motion to Compel against the company despite 
having complete access to the record and books. In the instant case, Source 1 was represented by 
two separate counsel with separate competing interests. 
This was and always had been a personal case between the two largest shareholders of 
the company. Prehn attempted portrayal of the case as an effort to protect Source 1 which in tum 
would benefit ALL the members' interest was misguided. This case should have been pied and 
tried as a direct action by Respondents under Idaho Code § 30-6-901 instead of the disguise of 
protecting the company and its members, especially since nearly all of Respondents allegations 
81 Vorse, at pp. 563-64. 
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were against Hodge, personally, as manager and liquidator. 
Based on the arguments and authorities set forth above, Hodge respectfully requests that 
the Court reverse the district court's decision in allowing Respondents to assert and maintain the 
derivative action on behalf of Source I against him for failing to address Respondents standing 
to properly assert the derivative claim, for failing to address whether Respondents made proper 
demand in compliance with Idaho Code § 30-6-902, for failing to address whether Respondents 
properly pled the derivative claims in their Second Amended Complaint on behalf of the 
company, for failing to address whether Respondents created a conflict of interest in employing 
the same counsel to represent their personal claims against the company, as well as the derivative 
claims on behalf of the company; and for failing to hear the Motion prior to allowing the merits 
of the claims to be held at trial. In addition thereto, Hodge respectfully requests that the Court 
reverse the district court's award of damages derived from the derivative claims. 
C. The District Court erred in finding as a matter of law that Hodge 
breached his fiduciary duties in the manner he orchestrated the asset 
auction for Source 1 and its members. 
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the district court noted that Hodge was 
responsible for selling the assets of the company. The auction took place on May 18, 2012 per 
the parties' agreement. Hodge divided the assets in five (5) lots as follows: 1. Shaker cup molds; 
2. Embroidery machines; 3. Office inventory; 4. Intellectual property; and 5. All lots. Prior to 
the auction, Hodge submitted proposed bidding instructions and the proposed division and 
definitions of the asset lots to all members, including their counsel and other participants. Other 
than complaints about the manner and process of the submission of the bidding to be taken, 
Respondents provided no other comments, suggestions or changes concerning the definitions of 
the asset lots and specifically, what property fell within which lot. On their final bids, Prehn 
was the highest bidder on the shaker cup molds ($96,000) and Office Inventory ($15, l 00) and 
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Hodge was the highest bidder on the embroidery machines ($10,010) and Intellectual Property 
($44,200). 
At the conclusion of the auction, Prehn was invoiced by Source 1 for the shaker cup 
molds and office inventory, while Hodge was invoiced for the embroidery machines and 
intellectual property. In the days following the auction, an issue arose concerning the use of the 
shaker cup molds containing intellectual property rights awarded and paid for by Hodge. Prehn 
elected not to pay Source 1 for his awards as the highest bidder. 
The district court concluded that Hodge breached his fiduciary duties to Source 1 and its 
members in the manner in which he orchestrated the asset auction. The district court held that 
Hodge created and manipulated the situation by separating the intellectual property from the 
molds and failed to advise the bidders that the molds could not be used for production unless the 
bidder also acquired the intellectual property. The district court found that the company was 
damaged in the amount of $60,300, the difference of the amount Source 1 would have received 
from the highest bids of Prehn and Hodge had Prehn elected to pay his awards. 
The district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law ignored the undisputed 
evidence, testimony and circumstances that surrounded the auction and the creation of the bid 
instructions which ultimately were accepted by all the parties, including their counsel. 
For each lot, Hodge provided a description defining the designated lot and submitted the 
instructions and description to all members, including Respondents' counsel at the time, for their 
review, comment and suggestions. 
In his description of Lot 4 Intellectual Property, Hodge expressed the following: 
Intellectual Property. This will consist of all goodwill in the company as well as 
all non tangible property of The Source Store, LLC. This will include all Names, 
Logo's, concepts, artwork, Product names, Website, Face book, Race concept. If 
there is any other intellectual properties that the membership would like to 
suggest please submit that request before Friday. (Emphasis added). 
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At the trial, Prehn argued that Hodge held an unconscionable auction despite dismissing 
all of his claims with prejudice that arose after the auction and which precipitated the filing of 
the Second Amended Complaint. 82 He testified that the auction was complicated and confusing 
despite having counsel representing his interest. He admitted that Hodge submitted proposed 
auction instructions to all the members, participants and their counsel for comment and that he 
did make some recommendations and changes to the instructions, but that Hodge was hostile and 
would not accept any other recommendations. Prehn could not explain what other material 
changes he wanted incorporated into the instructions. 
On cross examination, Prehn acknowledged that his primary concern with the auction 
was the process where he wanted a live auction rather than the 3 bid process. His fear was that 
Hodge had an unfair advantage by seeing everyone else's bid before he made his bid. To 
alleviate Prehn's concerns, Hodge agreed to submit his bid 5 minutes in advance of the other 
participant's bids. The issue of the process was moot as Prehn was the highest bidder for the 
shaker cup molds and office inventory. 83 There was no dispute that Hodge was the highest 
bidder for the intellectual property and embroidery machine and tendered his funds to Source 1 's 
account. 
Prehn could not explain what he thought intellectual property meant, although he 
acknowledged that it would include trade secrets. In the instructions, Hodge defined intellectual 
property in general as "This will consist of all goodwill in the company as well as all non-
tangible property of The Source Store, LLC." Thereafter, Hodge provided some examples and 
asked the membership to provide him any further suggestions about intellectual property. 
Respondents' First Amended Complaint alleged Hodge violated Idaho's Trade Secrets 
82 Order Granting Stipulation for Voluntary Dismissal With Prejudice, R., pp. 639-642. 
83 See Defendant's Exhibits 1060, 1061 and 1062. 
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Act defining the company's confidential information which included designs. Thereafter, 
Respondents filed their Second Amended Complaint on June 29, 2012 asserting verbatim the 
same causes of action asserted in the First Amended Complaint and then adding six new causes 
of action, all arising from the facts and circumstances arising from the auction process. All six 
causes of action were dismissed with prejudice prior to trial, including Respondents' claim for 
declaratory relief of whether the shaker cup contained any "protectable intellectual property of 
Hodge." See Second Amended Complaint. 
By voluntarily dismissing all of its claims with prejudice, specifically Claims 14 through 
19 asserted in the Second Complaint which arose directly from the auction process, Respondents 
waived any claim for damages arising from the auction process. 
In addition, the district court ignored material evidence that Prehn wanted to enter into a 
joint venture with Bodybuilding.com in the shaker cup business where Prehn proposed to design 
the molds and Bodybuilding.com would pay for the construction and delivery of the molds to the 
U.S. which would have saved Respondents a substantial sum without having to tender any of his 
monies to Source 1. 84 What the evidence showed was that Prehn made a poor business decision 
and attempted' to backdoor his decision and blame Hodge for an auction he had a duty to 
participate and cooperate in a manner which was fully transparent, accountable, fair and 
equitable to all members. Prehn's poor business decisions did not constitute evidence of Hodge 
breaching his fiduciary duty to Source 1 and its members who had a right and duty to actively 
participate in the process. 
Based on the substantial and competent evidence and testimony in the record, the district 
court erred in its findings of fact and conclusion of law that Hodge breached his fiduciary duty to 
Source 1 and its members in the manner the asset auction was held. The district court presumed 
84 See Defendant's Exhibit I 065. 
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without any evidence that Hodge created a situation where he was assured he would be the 
highest bidder on the intellectual property. This presumption is not supported in the record. The 
bidding was done by email by the participants situated at different locations. According to the 
bid instructions, all participants, including Respondents, were able to see the first two bids of all 
participants bidding on any particular lot. To alleviate any collusion and Respondents' fear that 
Hodge could have the opportunity to raise his bid on any lot after seeing Respondents' final bid, 
Hodge agreed to submit his final bid to counsel five (5) minutes before the final bids were to be 
submitted by the other participants. In other words, Hodge was bound by his final bid before 
Respondents submitted their final bid. It was impossible for Hodge to know how much 
Respondents would bid on the intellectual property. Based on the Respondents' final bid of 
$5, I 00, Respondents clearly did not believe the company's intellectual property was of any value 
despite asserting several causes of action against Hodge alleging he had violated Idaho's Trade 
Secrets Act, among other claims filed after and arising from the auction, only to dismiss the 
claims with prejudice prior to trial. 
Accordingly, Hodge respectfully requests that the Court reverse the district court's 
conclusion that Hodge breached his fiduciary duty to Source l and its members in the asset 
auction process and the damage award of $60,300. 
D. The District Court erred in finding as a matter of law that Hodge breached his 
fiduciary duties for failing to minimize the costs of completing the stipulated to 
purchase orders of the company. 
The district court held that Hodge breached his fiduciary duties to Source 1 and its 
members by failing to minimize the costs for completing the existing purchase orders that were 
in place and being processed at the time the members unanimously voted to dissolve Source 1 
effective as of April 1, 2012. The district court's method of valuing the alleged damages as lost 
profits by comparing the percentages of an ongoing concern business versus a company 
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undergoing a dissolution and liquidation process was erroneous and contrary to the substantial 
and competent evidence. The district court held that Source 1 should have received a net profit, 
rather than a net loss, during the dissolution process. In reaching this conclusion, the district 
court computed a percentage derived from a historical margin analysis of net profit and applied 
that percentage to the gross sales filled by Source 1 that were stipulated to and added the 
purchase order of Bodybuilding.com to arrive at a net profit of $90,891. The district court then 
deducted extraordinary expenses incurred during the same period resulting in a total net profit of 
$31,395 during the dissolution period. 85 The district court added back the net profit generated 
from January to March, 2012 and determined a total net profit for the entire year of 2012 should 
have been $114,530.86 
The district court noted that the issue for the lack of the net profit at the completion of the 
dissolution was based on the general and administrative expenses incurred during the liquidation 
period as compared to when Source 1 was a going concern. The district court noted that the 
gross percentage of expenses incurred in 2012 when Source 1 operated as a going concern for 
three (3) months were similar to the gross percentages of expenses for the entire year of 2010 
and 2011. However, during the nine (9) month liquidation period, the gross percentage of the 
expenses significantly increased. Accordingly, the district court expressed: 
The Court concludes that the significant increase in the General and 
Administrative expenses is the reason for the losses incurred in completing the 
existing purchase orders, as well as the overall loss for 2012. Except to point to 
litigation expenses related to this action, Defendants have been unable to 
demonstrate that there were legitimate business reasons that explain how or why 
these expenses increased so dramatically. (Emphasis added). 87 
Furthermore, the district court explained: 
85 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R., p. 776. 
86 See id. 
87 See id., p. 773-74. 
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The Court concludes that the operating loss on the existing purchase orders is the 
result of Hodge's breach of his fiduciary duty to minimize the costs to complete 
the purchase orders. The Court did not find the opinions of Hodge's expert, Peter 
Butler, persuasive or helpful. Mr. Butler analyzed Prehn's damages calculations 
and found fault. Mr. Butler did not present any analysis of Source l's expenses 
during the dissolution period. 88 
The district court placed the burden of proof on Hodge to show why the expenses 
increased, rather than on Respondents proving which expenses significantly increased, why 
certain expenses incurred were unnecessary or reasonable and the amount of the illegitimate 
expense. Instead, Respondents attempted to show lost profits that were not proven by a 
reasonable degree of certainty. 
In Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 346-47, 581 P.2d 784 (1978), the 
Idaho Supreme Court explained the measure of lost profits as follows: 
Although prospective profits hoped to be derived from a business which is not yet 
established but merely in contemplation are ordinarily too speculative to be 
recoverable, a plaintiff is not categorically denied the right to recover lost profits 
simply because he is engaged in a relatively new business. (Citation omitted). 
The pivotal question is not whether the plaintiff has proven an established earning 
record but whether he has proven the damages of lost profits with reasonable 
certainty, although the former is often relevant to the latter. (Emphasis added). 
Although lost profits are not always susceptible of mathematically accurate proof, they 
must be proven with reasonable certainty. Dunn v. Ward, 105 Idaho 354,356,670 P.2d 59, 61 
(App.1983). "Damages need to be proved only with a reasonable certainty and courts have 
determined this simply means that existence of damages must be taken out of the realm of 
speculation." Anderson & Nafziger v. G. T. Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175, 182-83, 595 P.2d 
709, 716-17 (1979). 
The district court's methodology of applying an on-going concern valuation to the 
undisputed fact that Source 1 was dissolved effective as of April 1, 2012 was erroneous. Based 
88 See id, R., p. 775. 
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on the evidence in the record, all of the evidence of alleged misconduct by Hodge occurred after 
the members voted to dissolve Source I and after the lawsuit was filed on April 27, 2012. Once 
the members unanimously voted to dissolve Source 1, the company was no longer operating as 
an on-going concern, but instead in a liquidation mode. Therefore, the alleged damages incurred 
by Source 1, moving forward, should have been focused on the expenses incurred during the 
liquidation period. The competent, credible and substantial evidence in the record confirmed and 
corroborated that this method was the correct measure of damages allegedly arising from a 
breach of fiduciary duties. The breach of fiduciary duty for failing to minimize the expenses 
would have derived from any alleged inappropriate, unreasonable, unrelated and excessive 
expenses incurred during the liquidation period, not whether Source 1 lost profits during the 
liquidation period. This measure of damages was implicitly agreed and stipulated to by the 
parties in the Court's May 17, 2012 Order. 
Provisions in the Order established that the proper measure of damages concerned only 
the expenses incurred during the dissolution and liquidation period. At the outset, Paragraph 1 in 
the Order provided: 
The dissolution and winding up of Source I (the "Dissolution") shall be 
completed as soon as is reasonably practicable, with the participation and 
cooperation of all parties, in a manner which is fully transparent, 
accountable, fair and equitable to all members of Source 1 and with the view 
to discharging all legitimate debts and other obligations of Source 1 and 
maximizing the return and final distribution of all remaining funds to all Source 1 
members. (Emphasis added). 
Paragraph 4 in the Order states, in relevant part: 
The parties further stipulate and agree that it is in the best interests of 
Source 1 and its members that, during and pursuant to the Dissolution, the 
overhead and other expenses of Source 1 be reduced to the absolute 
minimum necessary to complete the Dissolution, including without limitation 
the processing of the existing Purchase Orders and the sale of the Assets, in order 
to maximize the return and final distribution of funds to all Source 1 members. 
(Emphasis added). 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 36 
No checks shall be written on and no funds shall withdrawn from the 
Dissolution Account; provided, however, that bona fide and legitimate costs 
and expenses of Source 1 arising from the Dissolution and consistent with the 
parameters set forth in paragraph 1 and 4 may be paid from the Dissolution 
Account. 89 (Emphasis added). 
The evidence and testimony in the record clearly supported that the correct measure of 
damages was to assess the expenses incurred during the litigation period. Respondents failed to 
measure and prove Source 1 's damages in this fashion. 
In his testimony, Prehn testified that he arrived at ascertaining the alleged lost profit and 
business damages during the dissolution period by using a historical profit margin analysis of the 
company in 2011 and the first quarter of 2012 by a weighted average and then applied those 
historical margins and weighted average during the dissolution period of April to December, 
201 90 He concluded that during January through March, 2012, the company generated a net 
profit percentage of 10.5 percent, but during the last nine months of the dissolution period, the 
company generated a net loss of 11 percent or $93,000 which he concluded resulted in a 21 
percent swing. 91 
Prehn then testified that he arrived at the damages of lost profits by calculating what 
should have been the net sales during the dissolution period, multiplied that figure by the 
weighted historical profit margin for an expected net profit of $97,191 and then added back 
selling expenses and the loss of$93,000 for a total loss profit amount of$212,616.92 
On cross examination, Prehn testified he held no licenses or certifications in valuing or 
89 Order RE: Dissolution of the Source Store, LLC and Related Matters entered on May 17, 2012, R., pp. 121-127. 
90 TR., p. 96, LL 22-25 and p. 97, LL 1-4. 
91 TR., p. 99, LL 4-25. 
92 TR., p. 100, LL 22-25 and p. l O l, LI. 1-24. 
APPELLANT'S BR1EF - 37 
appraising a company.93 He testified that he had reviewed different business valuation 
techniques over the years and used Bizequity.com who provide online business valuation 
formulas in generating his assessment of lost profits.94 He explained that he never performed a 
business valuation for anyone other than for his ovvn curiosity.95 
Prehn testified he recognized there was a distinction of valuing an on-going concern 
versus a liquidation valuation.96 When asked whether it was reasonable to expect the net profit 
to erode when the company was in the liquidation process, he testified that he would have 
expected a net profit margin inflation rather than a net profit erosion based solely on comments 
made by Hodge that he estimated that the existing orders could be completed by May and the 
cost estimate he provided of $60,000 to $80,000 in that time period.97 He acknowledged that 
variable and fixed costs would continue to be incurred until all the orders were completed. 98 
Prehn did not explain what variable or fixed costs would continue during the liquidation process. 
Hodge called Peter l Butler, a chartered financial analysts and an accredited senior 
business appraiser.99 Mr. Butler had performed more than 50 business valuations in 2013 and 
was published in all major US business valuation journals. too He was instructed to analyze the 
calculation of the alleged damages presented by Respondents. 101 He expressed no opinions on 
the length of time it should have taken to process the existing orders nor what expenses, fixed or 
variable, would have been reasonable and necessary to complete the orders nor what expenses, if 
93 TR., p. 407, LI. 24-25 and p. 408, LI. 1-2. 
94 TR., p. 408, LI. 3-19. 
95 TR., p. 410, LI. 8-21. 
96 TR., p. 411, LI. 16-18. 
97 TR., p. 412, LI. 11-25 and p. 413, LI. 1-4. 
98 TR., p. 419, LI. 20-23. 
99 TR., p. 754, LI. 1-9. 
100 TR., p. 755, LI. 2-14. 
IOI TR., p. 755, LI. 22-25. 
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any, were excessive or unrelated to the liquidation process. 102 
Mr. Butler opined that the lost profits and business damages testified to by Prehn and 
exhibits was 
was erroneous. 103 He explained that one 
the approach 
not compare a company as a going concern 
a margin analysis to a company under liquidation referring to the approaches as "an apples to 
oranges comparison at best."104 He explained he would have expected the net profit margin to 
erode during the dissolution period which it did. He testified, "I would never compare a 
company as a going concern to a company in a liquidation process ... " and explained the 
appropriate manner in measuring any alleged damages in a dissolution process as follows: 
So I certainly wouldn't start with a margin analysis; rather I think the appropriate 
method to calculate any alleged economic damages here would be to go right to 
the source and compare and contrast the actual expenses which the company was 
now attempting to minimize in the liquidation process and compare and contrast 
those expenses and - to determine if any of those were allegedly excessive or not 
pertinent for the liquidation proceedings. '°5 
On cross examination, Respondents attempted to challenge and discredit his opinion 
alluding that the existing purchase orders took longer to process, thus increasing the cost of 
expenses, than what Hodge estimated at the membership meeting on April 13, 2012. 106 
However, the Respondents' questioning further corroborated and confirmed his opinion that 
Respondents method for measuring the alleged lost profits and business damages was erroneous 
and speculative. In response to the question that he was not expressing any opinion on the length 
ohime it should have taken to process the booked orders, he responded: "No. I have no opinion 
on that, other than the opinion I've expressed here that I would not have looked at a margin 
analysis. I would have done exactly what you're doing now, is looking at what would have been 
102 TR., p. 759, LI. 2-4. 
103 TR., p. 756, LI. 10-20. 
104 TR., p. 757, LL 18-25 and p. 758, LI. l-758 and p. 759, L. l. 
105 See id 
106 TR., p. 767, LI. 10-21. 
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excessive, potentially, if there are any excessive expenses." 107 
On redirect, Mr. Butler, again, opined that the profit margin analysis utilized by the 
Respondents was an erroneous method in this matter. He explained that he could not ascertain 
from Respondents' damages exhibits what expenses Respondents would have considered were 
required to process purchase orders to completion. ms 
Based on the arguments and evidence in the record, Hodge respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the district court's award oflost profits suffered by Source L 
E. The District Court erred in awarding Respondents Attorney Fees under Idaho 
Code § 12-120(3) for the derivative action. 
In response to the district court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the 
Respondents file their Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs seeking an award of attorney 
fees in the derivative action under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3); Idaho Code§ 30-6-906(2) and Idaho 
Code§ 12-121. 
At oral argument, Respondents argued and admitted that the litigation was not a "true 
directive action." This was confirmed in the district court's Memorandum Decision and Order 
where the court stated: 
Plaintiffs argue that this is not a true derivative action because they were seeking 
to enforce their rights under the Operating Agreement. Plaintiffs argue that 
they pursued the claims against Hodge as both direct and derivative claims. 
Plaintiffs argue that they suffered unique harm, apart from the other 
members, because it was uncertain whether any recovery would be sufficient 
to satisfy Prehn's loan and back salary and the capital accounts of the partners 
allowing for distribution to the members in proportion to their interests ... 
(Emphasis added). 109 
Despite the Respondents own admission that their claims were personal, and not for and 
on behalf of the company and ALL its members, the district court viewed all of the claims, 
!0
7 TR., p. 768, LI. 6-15. 
108 TR., p. 786, LI. 17-25 and p. 787, LI. 1-13. 
109 R., p. 1068-69. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 40 
except for Prehn' s claim for his loan and back salary, as derivative claims for Source 1, not a 
personal action by Respondents. The district court held that Respondents pursued a derivative 
claim, despite refusing to address the Joint Motion to Dismiss Derivative Claims which 
arguments in support of reversal are discussed above in Paragraph B. Throughout the entire 
litigation, it was clear that Prehn pursued the case to recover his personal loan and back salary 
from the company as a creditor under the disguise of a derivative action because he knew the 
company would not have the funds to repay him after the members unanimously voted to 
dissolve. Prehn fashioned and disguised the claims as derivative knowing that his personal 
damages against Hodge, if any, pursuant to Idaho Code § 30-6-90 I were minimal in comparison 
to his individual claim as a creditor against the company. 
Incidentally, the district court's award of damages to Source 1 against Hodge was nearly 
the same amount as Prehn'sjudgment against Source 1 for his loan and back salary, including 
interest, attorneys and costs. The only member entitled to the judgment amount awarded to 
Source l in the alleged derivative action was Prehn. 
The district court held that Hodge was liable for Respondents' attorney fees in pursuit of 
the alleged derivative action under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) concluding the gravamen of the 
action arose out of a commercial transaction. The district court expressed that Hodge breached 
his fiduciary duties for all of the claims liability was determined, as well as breaching the 
obligations of the Operating Agreement and Court's May 17, 2012 Order as to some of the same 
claims. 
In reaching its holding, the district court noted that a commercial transaction was defined 
as one which was not for personal or household purposes. It relied on the Idaho Supreme 
Court's statement in Reynolds v. Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A., 154 Idaho 21,293 P.3d 
645 (2013) which was quoted from prior decisions for the proposition that when a commercial 
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transaction was an integral part of the claim, the prevailing party was entitled to attorney fees 
whether the claim sounded in tort. The district court held that despite finding Hodge liable in 
tort, the gravamen of the action arose out of a commercial transaction between the Respondents 
and Hodge and therefore Respondents, more specifically Source 1, was entitled to attorney fees 
against Hodge under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) for the alleged derivative claims. Source 1 did not 
incur any attorney fees in pursuing the alleged derivative action which issue will be discussed 
below. 
In Contreras v. Rubley, 142 Idaho 573, 576, 130 P.3d 1111, 1114 (2006), the Idaho 
Supreme Court articulated the standard of review of an award of attorney fees as follows: 
The district court's decision to award attorney fees is a discretionary decision, 
subject to the abuse of discretion standard of review. (Citation omitted). To 
determine whether the trial court abused its discretion, this Court considers ( 1) 
whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) 
whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and 
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to 
it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by exercise of reason. 
(Citation omitted). 
In reaching its decision, the district court ignored the Respondents own admissions and 
arguments that the alleged derivative claims pursued was a personal and direct action against 
Hodge and intended to recover Prehn' s personal claim against Source 1. The Respondents' 
admission and arguments qualified as a judicial admission that the alleged derivative action was 
in fact a pursuit of a personal and direct action warranting a dismissal of the derivative claims. 
In In Re Universe Life Ins. Co., 144 Idaho 751, 759, 171 P.3d 242 (2007), the Idaho 
Supreme Court defined a judicial admission as follows: 
"A judicial admission is a statement made by a party or attorney, in the course of 
judicial proceedings, for the purpose, or with the effect, of dispensing with the 
need for proof by the opposing party of some fact." (Citation omitted). "A 
judicial admission is a deliberate, clear, unequivocal statement of a party about a 
concrete fact within the party's peculiar knowledge, not a matter oflaw ... [and] 
not opinion." (Citation omitted). 
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Here, Hodge and Source 1 filed their joint motion to dismiss the derivative claims 
asserting, among other issues, that Respondents' claims were a personal and direct action against 
Hodge disguised as directive claims for which the district court denied as untimely. Respondents 
admitted as much in their argument to the district court which dispensed the need of Hodge and 
Source 1 to prove that fact 
Idaho Code§ 30-6-901(2) states that a member maintaining a direct action must plead 
and prove actual or threatened injury that is not solely the result of an injury suffered or 
threatened to be suffered by the company. The district court's order noted that Respondents 
argued that they suffered a unique harm that other members did not and more specifically 
concerning the repayment of Prehn's loan and back salary from Source L However, the 
evidence presented and the district court's award of damages was not focused on Respondents 
actual, threatened or unique harm suffered personally, but instead determined on damages 
suffered by Source 1. 
In Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., Inc., 152 ldaho 741,274 P.3d 1256 (2012), the Idaho 
Supreme Court analyzed the intent of the prevailing party in determining whether the claim was, 
in fact, truly for a commercial purpose triggering an award under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3). Here, 
the Court denied the prevailing party's request under the statute explaining its reasoning as 
follows: 
The Carillos transacted with Boise Tire in order to obtain services for their 
personal vehicle and there is no indication that they intended to use the benefit 
of those services for a commercial purpose. The transaction here at issue 
therefore lacked the symmetry of a commercial purpose necessary to trigger LC. § 
12-120(3), and the district court properly denied the Carillos' request for attorney 
fees. 
Id., 152 Idaho at 756,274 P.3d at 1271. (Emphasis added). 
Unlike in Carillo, where there was no evidence or indication that the action was intended 
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for a commercial purpose which warrant the denial of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-
120(3 ), in the instant case, Respondents admitted that the alleged derivative action was intended 
to recover damages for personal purposes, i.e. Prehn's loan and back salary. The Respondents 
own admission unequivocally removed an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) 
rendering the district court's award in error as a matter oflaw. 
Furthermore, Idaho law has long held the proposition that "[W]here two statutes deal 
with the same subject matter, the more specific will prevail." State v. Wilson, 107 Idaho 506, 
508, 690 P.2d 1338, 1340 (1984). The more specific statute controls. See Shay v. Cesler, 132 
Idaho 585, 588, 977 P.2d 199, 202 (1999). 
The Idaho Uniform Limited Liability Company Act ("IULLCA") applies and governs 
derivative actions filed by members on behalf of the limited liability company. Specifically, 
Idaho Code § 30-6-906(2) provides the statutory authority for a plaintiff to seek an award of 
attorney fees incurred in a derivative action. No case authority was provided that Idaho Code§ 
12-120(3) was applicable in a derivative action. Accordingly, an award of attorney fees in the 
alleged derivative action, if any, must be derived from Idaho Code § 30-6-906(2) and cannot be 
awarded under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3). 
Appellant respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's award of attorney 
fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3). 
F. The District Court erred in awarding Respondents Attorney Fees against Hodge 
through Idaho Code § 30-6-906(2) for the alleged derivative action. 
The district court also held that Respondents could recover their attorney fees that Hodge 
was personally liable for in the alleged derivative action under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) through 
the company's recovery under Idaho Code§ 30-6-906(2). Essentially, the district court awarded 
Source 1, through the Respondents pursuit, the award of attorney fees against Hodge under LC. § 
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12-120(3) as part of the Source 1 's judgment and then awarded the Respondents the same 
attorney fees to be recovered through the Source 1 's judgment under I.C. § 30-6-906(2). 
However, Source 1 never incurred any attorney fees to pursue the alleged derivative claim. 
Idaho Code§ 30-6-906 entitled "Proceeds and expenses" states: 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) of this section: 
(a) Any proceeds or other benefits of a derivative action under section 30-6-
902, Idaho Code, whether by judgment, compromise or settlement, belong 
to the limited liability company and not to the plaintiff; and 
(b) If the plaintiff receives any proceeds, the plaintiff shall remit them 
immediately to the company. 
(2) If a derivative action under section 30-6-902, Idaho Code, is successful in 
whole or in part, the district court may award the plaintiff reasonable 
expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees and costs, from the recovery of 
the limited liability company. (Emphasis added). 
The district court noted that the IULLCA repealed and supplanted the prior Act codified 
at Idaho Code§ 53-601 et seq. which did not contain a similar provision as Idaho Code§ 30-6-
906(2). It relied on Knutsen v. Frushour, 92 Idaho 3 7, 436 P .2d 521 ( 1968) which affirmed an 
award of attorney fees to a shareholder in a derivative action on the general proposition that a 
shareholder in a successful derivative action may be awarded attorney fees. However, the 
Knutsen decision was decided well before the enactment of the IULLCA and was not decided on 
statutory authority codified, and more particularly Idaho Code§ 30-6-906(2) which was added in 
2008. Hodge's research has discovered no appellate decisions interpreting Idaho Code§ 30-6-
906(2) nor its application. 
In interpreting s statute, the Idaho Supreme Court has expressed the following rules of 
construction: 
Interpretation of a statute begins with an examination of the statute's literal 
words. (Citation omitted). Where the language of a statute is plain and 
unambiguous, courts give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in 
statutory construction. (Citation omitted). Only where the language is ambiguous 
will this Court look to rules of construction for guidance and consider the 
reasonableness of proposed interpretations. (Citations omitted). "Moreover, 
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unless a contrary purpose is clearly indicated, ordinary words will be given their 
ordinary meaning when construing a statute. (Citations omitted). In construing a 
statute, this Court will not deal in subtle refinements of the legislation, but will 
ascertain and give effect to the purpose and intent of the legislature, based on the 
whole act and every word therein, lending substance and meaning to the 
provisions. (Citation omitted). 
In re Estate a/Wiggins, 155 Idaho 116,119,306 P.3d 201,204 (2013) (quoting Curlee v. 
Kootenai Cnty, Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 398, 224 P.3d 458,465 (2008)). 
The IULLCA is the only statutory authority which specifically applies and governs 
derivative actions filed by members on behalf of the limited liability company. Idaho Code§ 30-
6-906(2) provides the statutory authority for a member to seek an award of attorney fees incurred 
in a derivative action. Idaho Code § 30-6-906(2) plainly states that an award of attorney fees are 
recoverable from the recovery awarded to the limited liabilitv company. The statute does not 
state that the member may receive an award of attorney fees for the recovery awarded to the 
LLC. When the language is unambiguous, there is no need for the Court to apply statutory rules 
of construction to ascertain the intent. 
The district court held that Idaho Code § 30-6-906(2) did not preclude it from awarding 
attorney fees against Hodge, but provided it discretion to make an award of fees to be paid out of 
the recovery from Source 1. However, as stated above, the district court awarded Source 1 
attorney fees which it never expended against Hodge, personally, under LC.§ 12-120(3) then 
granted the Respondents to recover those same attorney fees through Source 1 's judgment which 
included the award of attorney fees that it never incurred. 
The district court's interpretation of the statute implies that Idaho Code § 30-6-906(2) is 
merely a basis for the recovery of an award of fees from Source 1 's judgment rather than a 
primary basis to request an award for attorney fees in a derivative action. This is an incorrect 
application and interpretation of the statute. 
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If Respondents were entitled to an award of attorney fees for pursuing the alleged 
derivative claim; the award, if any, should have had to come from the recovery received by 
Source 1 which recovery should not have included an award of attorney fees which it did not 
incur to pursue the alleged derivative action. 
As such, Hodge respectfully requests that the Court reverse the district court's award of 
attorney fees under Idaho Code § 30-6-906(2). 
V. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Hodge is asserting and claiming his reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred on 
appeal pursuant to I.AR. 40 and I.AR. 41 and pursuant to Article 15 of the Operating 
Agreement. 110 
Attorney fees are awardable only where they are authorized by statute or contract. Heller 
v. Cenarussa, 106 Idaho 571,682 P.2d 524 (1984). 
Article 15. 1 (a) of the Operating Agreement applies to Hodge because he qualifies as a 
"Covered Person" as defined therein. 111 Provided in Article 15 is a provision for "Exculpation" 
which states, in relevant part: 
... no Covered Person shall be liable to the Company or to any other Person for 
any act or omission related to the Company and the conduct of its business, this 
Agreement, any related document, or any transaction or investment contemplated 
by this Agreement, any related document, or any transaction or investment 
contemplated by this Agreement or any related document to the extent that: (a) 
such act was committed or such omission was made (i) in good faith by the 
Covered Person, and (ii) in the reasonable belief that such act or omission was in 
the Company's best interests and within the scope of such Covered Person's 
authority, as granted pursuant to this Agreement; and (b) such act or omission did 
not constitute Disabling Conduct. 112 
Article 15 also provides a provision for "Indemnification" which states, in relevant part: 
"
0 R.,p.191-93. 
111 See id., p. 191. 
112 See id., p.192. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 47 
... the Company hereby indemnifies each Covered Person against and hereby 
agrees to defend and protect s,uch Covered Person against and to hold such 
Covered Person free and harmless from any and all Claims arising from or 
otherwise related to such Covered Person's act or omission to extent that (a) 
such act was committed or such vu,e1c,0,vu was related to 0111nc,,",' or its 
business, this Agreement, any related document, or any transaction or investment 
contemplated by this Agreement or any related document; (b) such act was 
committed or such omission was made (i) in good faith by such Covered Person, 
and (ii) in the reasonable belief that such act or omission was in the Company's 
best interests and within the scope of such Covered Person's authority, as granted 
pursuant to this Agreement; and ( c) such act or omission did not constitute 
Disabling Conduct. 113 
Finally, Article 15.8 titled "Successful Defense" states: 
To the extent that any covered Person is successful on the merits in defense of 
any Proceeding, the Covered Person shall be deemed and considered entitled to 
exculpation under Section 15. 2 hereof and indemnification under Section 15. 3 
hereof. 114 
Based on the case law and arguments presented above warranting the dismissal of the 
derivative claims and damages arising therefrom and the reversal of the award of attorney fees, 
Hodge respectfully request for an award of its reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing case law, statutory authority, admissions and arguments above, 
Hodge respectfully requests that this Court reverse: 1) the district court's denial of the motion to 
dismiss the derivative claims and all the damages arising therefrom and 2) the district court's 
award of attorney fees under Idaho Code§§ 12-120(3) and 30-6-906(2) and remand the matter 
with instructions that the case be tried as a direct action by Respondents pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 30-6-901. 
113 See id. 
114 See id., p. 193. 
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